ON THE MULTI-PREFERENCE APPROACH TO EVALUATING OPPORTUNITIES by Klaus Nehring et al.
On the Multi-Preference Approach 
to Evaluating Opportunities 
Klaus Nehring and Clemens Puppe 
Working Paper Series No. 97-07 
February, 1997 
Note:  The Working Papers ufthe Department of Economics, University of California, Davis, are preliminav 
materials circulated to invite disc~tssion  and critical comment. These papers may be freely circuluted but to 
protect their tentative character they arc
1  not to be quoted without the permission of the author. 1  Introduction 
lrr~agine  an individual who faces the following two-stage decision prol~lem.  In the 
first stage, the individual has to choose among different opportunity sets. In  the 
second stage, exactly one alternative from the set determined by  the first stage 
decision has to be chosen.  In such a situation, one may think of  two different 
factors determining first  stage choices.  First, each  menu entails  zndzrect  ukl- 
zty derived  from the ultimately chosen  alternative. Secondly, a decision  maker 
might attach intrinsic value t.o the range of second-stage choices (on the irnpor- 
tance of the intrinsic value of choice in  individual decision making,  see eg.  Jones 
and Sugden [4] and Sen  [14, 151). The aim of  the present  paper is  to develop a 
rnlnzmal, and in  this sense general theory of  "preference  for opportunities"  that 
combines both aspects. 1Vhile perhaps not  terribly ambitious, a minimal thcory 
does not seem to I)(,  without  merits in view of  the conceptual  elusivt,nt.ss  and 
complexity of  the notion of  "freedom of  choict "  With our analysis  \w intend 
t.o clarify and Icnd  support to thc rrrlzrglng  rr~~ilt,i-pref(:rrnce  cor~ct~ljt~iallz;itlorl 
of ,'preference for opporturilties" (sw r,.g  .Jorrrs and Sugcit>n  [?I,  Pat.t.an;iik iuld 
Xu [lo]).  Thc arlalysis is  rn~n,irnal~s~:~c  in that wc  corlsitier orderirigs of sets that. 
are comparable  wit.t~  respect  to sr.1 ir~clusior~,  such  orderings  will  bc  referrcd 
to as qualztufzrlc set order.5 (QSOs) '  'I'hr proposed  theory  rria~ntains  thr least 
cuntroversial  assumption in ,the corltc>xt  of' ranking opportunities, rriirilely  t.hat 
for any given opport.un~ty  set no sulwt can  havct greater valur, thar~  the or~gir~al 
srt. (condition ,\I.  cf. Sect  2)'  Thc focus 1s  t,herefore whether or  not, for  any 
glven  pair  (A,  I]) of  sc,is.  :I  \ U is  of  rl~arg~nal  value when  W is  ava~lahle.  I\ 
dccision  maker's QSO thus d~rscrihes  tht. value of  additional opportunit,ies whilr 
being silent about trade-offs. 
Given an order~ng  of  the baslc alt.r~rriatives,  the  indirect utility principle con- 
pares opportunity sets solely on thr. basis of  preference  between  best elements 
in cach  opportunity set  A  first  s1:ep  ht:yond  this is  to assume a  "preferenct~ 
for flexibility" clue  to uncert<unty  about future tastrs (see the classic art~cle  by 
Kreps [5]) For instance, suppose that an indiv~di~al  is uncertain about his prcf- 
crences  between  the altcrnst.~vc~s  I and y. 'I'hcri. in  terms of  flexib~lity  the set 
{r,  y} would  he strrctly prefi3rred  to rither {r)  and  ly}. In general, one would 
have .-I U {z}  %  .4  if and onl)- IS z is  superlor to all elements in  A with  pn.sztz~,t. 
probabllzty  Intll~t~vely.  prefercncc' for  flt'xibility  rriay thus  1~  concvpt~lalizcd  by 
the notion of  r~.p((.trd  ~TL(IITML  ulzlrty  Howc;vcxr,  thk ~nterprctation  IS unncct~s- 
sarily particular  More gttnerally. 11  IS conce~viihlt~  that :I  U {z}  + .:I  ~f and c)rily 
if r  is superior  to  all  elemrr~ts  Iri  :I  with  respect  to sorrlt,  pos.ctbl~  ~rreferc,rlct> 
In  contrast  1.0  t,he st,t of  prot~ablr  prt~fr~rc,nccs,  111(~  st7t,  of  (relcvarltly) .'possi\~lr*" 
'The trrm "qualitnt~ve"  rrf~rs  to the fa<-t  that a ($50  15 otlly rl~~fi~lr~~i  or1 the.  dolzts~rl  of  all 
pars  (.A.  H) such that :1  C  H.  (or H  C  .A 
'~ence,  the theory abstracts from phenr~rnma  su<-h  as  "wrakrless ,d will," or  .'effort-of- 
decision <-osts."  ilr any other rt>st~n,-ttivris  i,rl  thc iie~.~\t<rr~  tnakrr's ab~ltty  to (chooi,, from h~s 
~~pportunitirs prc:ferences  in general m~ght  includ,. any legitimate,  or reasonable, or plausibl~ 
preference  ordering ever1  if  it,  has  zero subjective probab~lity.  In particular, a 
pwference may be possible  because it can  ztself be chosen. 
Any of these interpretations entails the following restriction on a QSO. Sup- 
pose that for sorne set A  the addition of the alternative x is of positive marginal 
value. Then the addition of r to any subset B 5  A must be of positive marginal 
value as well. We will refer to this property a5  a condition of "Contraction Con- 
s~stency"  (condition CC,  cf. Sect. 2) "his  condition makes intuitive sense even 
from a more general perspective based on the notion of diversity of opportunztzes. 
Indeed, suppose that diversity strictly increases when the alternative r is added 
to the set A. Now, any diversity possessed by a subset of A  is also possessed  by 
A  Hence, the addition of x to any subset B 2 A  must strictly increase diversit\- 
;is well.  'Thus, condlt~on  (~'C  seems to be an appropriate general condition for 
r,valrrating opportunities. In  part.~cular,  ill the above interpretations in terms of 
rrlrlltrple prctfcrrl~ccs  orle rllay  allow for  co-actunlzty of  the different  prcfrrenctw 
i3.g ;is ilifft,rer~t ..polnt,s of  vl.ew."  For  instance,,  ~IIY  may tierivc  i~tility  fro111 
corlsurnlng  thc fantasy nf ~loi~lg  a n~illt,ituci~  of things while knowing that thoy 
wo~l't  t)r dorlt. 
135.  a  result  of 1irt.l)~  [T,]  condit~ons  hl and CC arc the only rcst,rictions on 
..prrfrrrnce for fenlh~l~t,y.'  nrim:i  hence or1 "preference for opport.unitics." (hnse- 
quently. conditlorla 11  anti ( 'i'  art the key  axioms of this papcr, itnd our goal is to 
t>splt~rt  thc rt>sult~ng  5truc.t urc.  A  QSO  satisfying M  and (X' will he referred  to 
;IS a  ~on.szst~i~t  qualztiltlw .set  ord(,r  ((:'QSO). Iireps [5] has shown further that 51 
;111d  is('  rrrnaln thc orlly rml r~ctiuns  IS onc assumes an additive, i.e  an expected 
~rldirc,ct ut~llty  rclirt~serltatlr~ri  I'hus even under that much more structure, t,he 
('QSO captures ,'whcrc the,  il(:tlon is." 
In  c,ontrast to thc recvrlt  l~teraturc  on multi-preference conceptr~alizat~ions  of 
bpr~fererlce  for oppc~rturiit~rs'  (see [4], \10]). such a conceptualizat~or~  arlses herr 
from a repiwtntatzon thtwrt.rri. This has t,wo lnlportant implications. First, the 
principlv  that adtl~r~g  opportunities  is  always .strzctly preferred,  as sorrictirrlcs 
;tssr~rnc~tl  III the 11ti.rarurc on frrrdo~r~  of choice." (.annot be corisidered  a general 
pr~~~uplc  of c~v;iluati~~g  c~l~[~ortun~ticts  Secondly. for a typical ('($30  t.hrx rnarginal 
\-;11111~ of  addlng an  altt.rniit~\.e  1s  cor~texi-depfrldent,  it,, in  gencral  there exist 
5rts :I.  /I  iind altrrniit 1vt.s  1..  !I such that, 
\  .  nntl  Au{,y}--.A, 
'\l't, r~ott:  that.  ylverl ~.011~i1111111  11  fro111 iibovr and tl.dns~t  lvrty. condition ('(' IS rqu~viflrrll 
to  lirt,ph' (ronci~t~<~n  (I i)  (\(,? [i,  >G7]). 
'k.  the pr~r~cli,lr  i,f  .F~TIC~  nionotoni( it) with resprrt to set inclusion IS assurnrd In (;ravt>l 
[:ij.  ;tn(i irripl~t~l  In  I'ift~nna~k  ,ir~ri  Xu  [!,I  Similar1 5tr1,t monotonic~ty  1s  irnplied in  tlir 
r~~o(le,ls  c<~~i~id~~rrd  lr!  Ho5wr1  ,  IJ,it t anaik and XI] [2] the literature on rank~ng  sets may not be very  helpful in the context of  ranking 
opportunities, see Section  2 for further discussion. 
The present  paper provides refinements of  Kreps' result  based on two rnotl- 
vations.  First. one may want to incorporate (resp. ax~omatically  characterize) 
constraints on  the set of  possible  preferences such as the "r~gid"  superiority of 
some alternat~ve  x  to another y for all  possible preferences.  While the implica- 
tions of rigid weak preference on the CQSO are straightforward, the implications 
of rigid strzct preference are more complex and involve restrictions on the entire 
CQSO. We are also interested in clarifying the relation between multi-preference 
representations  in  an opportunity context and multi-preference rationalization 
of  cho~ce  functions as  provided  by  the well-known  theorem of  Aizcrrnan and 
Malishevski  [I]. Taking a cue  from  the analysis of  Puppe  [12], it  turns out 
that on  the class  of  CQSOs  satisf.ing a condition  1IE  (for.  "Irrr~lcvance  of 
Inessent~al  Elements") Kreps' represcntat.ion theorc~rr~  sprc~iilizrs  to that of  Aiz- 
crrr~an/Mallshc~vski  (ser S~ct~on  7). This raisrs  the  qucstion  wht,thcr  Ilk: 1s 
a mcrc t.rchnical artvfact, or  ivhethrr  it  has substance, and  mow spcc~fically 
whether  III*: can  be  understood  wlthin  the nlultt-preference aproacl~  itself  if'(> 
answr,r this qut,stion by  characteriz~ng  IIE 111 terms of  two alternativcl conditions 
on  the reprcirntat~on  that  there  ~ex~st  a rtyprcsenting  set  of  lznecir. orderings 
(Thc*ort>m  6  1). or  that there  exist  a set  of  representing  prcfcrcncc  orderings 
that  is  cont,rr In  ari  appropriate sense  (Theorem 5 1)  Ii~triguingly,  each  of 
thcw rtqliirrrl~t~nts  can t)r, imposed on the, nlr~lt,i-preference  rationalization of  a 
choice function  ~clthouf  losa of  q~nrralzty.5  The notion of  convexity, introduced 
in St,hring  [7]  as  ~~clos~~ti~iess  under  cornpromise."  expresses  the intuitive Idea 
that ordcr~ngs  t,hat Ile  ..1n  he~~ween"  possible orderings should Itself  hc possihlr 
'Ttils seems a natural enough rf,quirrrnent if "possible" is interpreted as "reason- 
able," or  .'legit~rrlate."  but less so under a flexibi~i;~  interpretation of  "possible" 
as  "probahlr "  It is not  rnt~rely  clear  how  to assess  thc strength of  IIE. Whilc 
the linearity r.tiaracterizat~on  imports sornc Havour of  genericity on it, we  show 
hy  means of  two  r.sarriplrs t.11at  it  may  tw  rich In  irnpllcations not  obtainablf, 
wit.hout II 
The paper  org,lni/cd ,is follows  Section  2  tntroduces sornc basic  ~1r.tinitlon~ 
nnti  hrlefl~  discusses  thr ~isuf,  of  context-dependence  Rased  on  the result  of 
Kwps [5] Yrction  3 dcri~es  I he  rq-rrsr,ntation of  a. CQSO bk  rnc,ans  of  rnulti 
pltx  I,rc,fert,r~ce5  on thc wt of  alternati\rs  The,  interrelation  brtwcrn  n ('QSO 
ant1 preft'rencesov~~r  alternatives, specifically  the problem of  rigidity  of  strict 
prefercncc. is  tilscussed  In Section  4. Sectwn 5  prowdes the characterization of 
IIE rankings as those that admit a convex reprcwntation. ('ondition IIE 1s  fur- 
tht,r cxarn~nrcl  in  Sect,ion 6. where it is shown to \)? the riecessary and sufficient 
condition  lor  thr cxistmc 1,  of a repres~ntatmn  ~ith  inriltiplt~  IZTIP(L~  preferences 
Also  it is demonitrated t,  rnrans of  two 'xamples  that IIE allows for inference. 
from  parllnl  knoll lcdgr of  a  ('QSO  As  a  furthcr application of  IIP:,  Scctiun 7 rstabl~shes  the l~nk  between  QSOs and cho~ce  frinct~ons ('onclud~ng  remarks 
arc offered  in  Sect~on  8  All proofs are found In an appendlx 
2  Basic Definitions #and  Facts 
Let .Y  be a finite set of alternatives and denote by  P
O(X) := P(X)  \ (0)  the 
set of all  non-empty subsets of X.  By  X(X) we  denote the set of all  pairs 
(A, U)  E P
O(X) x  P
O(X) which are ordered by set inclusion, i e. 
X(X) := {(A,  R)  E p0(X)  x  pO(X)  : A C  B or B  A) 
Hy  we denote a reflexive  binary relation in  C(X). We call  an orderzng  zn 
C(,Y)  if  anti only ~f  1s  complete and trans~tive  zn  X(S),  i.cx,  if  anti only if 
for all (.-I. H)  E  COY), [A  t  B  or  >-  .A], and for all  (/;. B).  (U,  L'),  (A,  C')  E 
\'(.Y).  [:I  >  f1 and M  > c']  3  :I  :r  (:  AII order~ng  in  X(.Y)  1s  itlso  referred 
to ;ts a  q~~alz/n/zl~c  )t-t  order  (QSO)  'Itif:  ~nt~nded  ir~terpr~tailon  of k  IS  that 
:I  N ~f  itrld only if  .-I  entails at lest its  rnuch  "opportun~ty  vitlur."  as fl. The. 
syrr~rrlt>tr~c  and asyrnrr~ttr~c  parts of k  arc, c1c.fincd  as usual. i.t,  i\ -  B .e  [A 
U  and U  A], ;tnd rl > I1  .t$  [:I  11  itnd not. B  /I], respect,ivcly  Note that 
hy t.r;tns~t.~v~ty  of 5,  both relations, -  and k.  ;m  transit~ve  in C(S) 
'Thc  ~nt,criticd  ~r~tcrprctat~on  of  ~hc  QSO 5 as describing a  "preference  for 
opportunit~rx"  1s  formally captured by  the following two hasic cor~d~t~ons. 
M  (Monoton~c~tj)  For a11  B C  .I,  2 11 
Slonotonic~ty  states that any set  A  enta~ls  at least as rnuch opportunity valuc 
as any of ~ts  subsets  Note that, given condition M,  a b~nary  rrlation  in C(S) 
is  autornat~cally  con~plete  in C(X)  Furt.herrnore, in  this case t  is  transitive, 
1ri  X(S) ~f and only ~f for  all sets  A.  13, C:  Pil(S)  such  that ,4  C  R  C  C'. 
[.4 -  I1 and N -  C']  a  rl -  ('  'I'hr:  swond t~as~c  conditioll is as follows. 
1 U  {s}  * .I 3 H U {s} * U 
('or~trxt~on  cons~stcncj  5tatm that ~f  jo~rl~ng  thrl tlernent x  to .I Increases  thc 
entailed opportun~ty  valuc then thi:;  value must also 1ncrcaw whtn jo~ning  s  to 
thc sn~all(,r  set  B C  .-1  Note that sincr- t  IS  reflexive,  thr'  elt,rr~rnt  x E  .Y  Iri 
('(' cannot be conta~nd  In  "1  Vl'e  w~ll  say th;tt an clcrrlr~nt.  x @  .4 is  ~ss~ntz(~1 
at '4  if  xnti only if  .4 U  {x}  > .4,  that IS ~f  ;tnd only ~f  ~t rr~;irg~r~;tlly  enhar~cos 
opportun~ty  valuc  Othcrw~sc,  lf r $!  :I  and !I  -  tl U {s)  wc,  w~ll  say that .r  I:, 
~nesstnt~al  ut '4  IIcncc,.  C(' may t)e rephrased  as follows  Suppose. that s  $!  :I 
IS t:ssent~al at :I  Then s  [nust hc.  cserit~al  at any sribse~  11 of :I 
In our approach. we takt conditions M and CC as ~mpl~citly  drfining the, 
not  on  of  "pr(~f(~rr~ncc  for opport  un~  t ~cs  "  llc~r~cc~.  the,  ot)~r,ct  of our st.r~dy  is  t hi, 
srt of  QSOs  In  X(S)  wtr~c.h  s;tt~+,fy  XI  ;tnd ('(' I\'t, rc,fc,r  to it QSO sat~sfy~ng M  and CC as a  conststent  qualztatzue  sc!  order (CQSO)  and denote the set of 
all CQSOs in C(X)  by Rc,c:(S) 
The simplest examples of  CQSCk are indirect utility preferences,  A  CQSO 
is said to be an zndrrert  ~~tzltty  preference (henceforth: Ill-preference)  if  and 
only if  there exists a complete  prt>tbrence ordering  R  on  X such  that for  all 
(A,  B)  qx), 
A  R  for all 6 t  13  there cx~sts  a t  A  such that all6 
If 5  IS an IU-preference  w1t11 untlerly~ng  preference  order~ng  H, we  w~ll  wrltc 
5 = IU(R) 
Any CQSO  canon~cally  Induces the follow~ng  partla1 order6  It:,  - on X  For 
all L,  y € .Y> 
2  R:y  G  {x} -  {x\  I/}  (2 1) 
Fact  2.1  Let  E R(~-(~.(X)  and  ict  I?>  hr  thr  znduced  partznl  ortlcr  on .Y. 
- 
'I'hcn rRky  zf  and only if  fo~.  all fl ('  such thal 13,  {x,  y} C  (,',  - 
llcnce, LH>~  if  and on1  ~f a tiwis~c~n  rriaker would always be w~lling  t,o exchange 
y  for  L  independently  of  the  coiltext  in  which  x  arid  y  occur.  Note that. in 
general, for given elements z,  n  E  .Y. (2.2)  will  hc true for sornc 13, 0" E  Pu(X) 
ant1 for others not 
If,'-preferences can be cli;lra(-teri:rcti oil Y(,Y)  hy a condition wh~ch  in effi,ct 
Theorem 2.1  Lct  E  'R,,c(,Y). Then t  2.s  cLn  Ili-prefer~nce  zf  and  only 
the tndured  partzal  ordtr I(>  -  IS  corr~plcte  on .Y. 
- 
"rhe  term "partial orrirr"  IS soniet~rnes  rewrv~d  for  binary  relat~ons  that are reflewivr. 
transitive and anttsymnlt~trl,.,  whrl-ras a hnary rr:lation satisfying ~ust  rrflexlvity and transi~ 
tiv~ty  IS sometimes called a prrordtr  In  th~s  paper. dntisyrnmetry is  nowhf.r~~  assumed and 
t~oth  ternis are used synonymo~rl! 
7,  The context-independence I.IIII~ILIU~I  (;!  2)  is strong in  that it allows tho sr:ts  H  and (1,.  yj 
to have non-empty lntersect~on.  tlowever. I  hr Importance of  this feature seems rather lirn~tetl. 
In  particular,  Irl Nehring and l'uppe  [8]  It  IS shown  that on non-fin~tt  ~io~liains  even  very 
weak context-ir~depende~ice  conditions  (w~th  a disjn~rlt~~ess-clause)  Imply thr ~rl(l~rt'ct  utility 
principle provided that the srt of  altt-rnatives  is  rii-h ~'riough. In concluding th~s  section, wc note that In our context the requirernrmt of  slrzct 
monotonicity with respect  to set inclusion wor~ld  imply 12>  = {(x,  x)  : x E .Y } 
Hence, such  a requlrernent  is  incompatible  with the notlon  that t,he decislon 
maker may have some (non-trivial) prc:frrences  (s)he 1s  corrlrrlitted  to (cf. Son 
[15], Puppe [ll.  121) 
3  Setting the Stage: The Basic Representation 
Theorem 
In  the following, it will  be convenient  to work  with the asymmetric part + of 
an ordering  in  C(?i) as the primitive notion. Suppose that.  is complete irl 
Z(X),  as is e.g  the case ~f  satisfies condition L4.  Then, A F  H a  not B  :I 
Ifence,  is  trans~tlvr  if and only if+ is  ne;;at,~vel  translt~vc-  in  thc:  sensr3 tt~at 
for all (,,I,  B).  (/I,('),  (.-LC')  L(X), 
1,t.t  'P(:(~.(.Y)  dcnote tiit, wt  of a11  as,yrnmetr~c  CQSOs,  LC. thc set of';ill  relat,ro~~> 
>-  in  C(.Y)  wh~rti  arc,  rirgat~wly  transitive In  X(X) and satisfy  condit,ions  .\I 
;mtl ( '(:.  Obviously. :-  'P(,(,(X)  if md  only if ~ts  con~plerrlcnt  is  ill 'R(~.,~.(.Y) 
I'hr  basit:  const rrlctlorl  oS  thc f~~llowlng  analysis leans hrlaviiy on Kreps [5] 
Our prese~~tat~o~i.  h~\\.i~vt~r.  c-nlphasizrs how  the, rnultr-preference reprrsentatiorl 
t,rrlt:rgm  naturxii>~  froril  ;in  imalysis of  the structure of  thr stit of  CQSOs  Thr. 
following fact  15  c.asil!  -~.;int~lishcd. 
Fact  :].I suggws tht,  following t,wo qnt+itions.  \Vllat  are the CQSOs that are 
minlrnal with rcsprXct  tii  set  inclusion, and. car1 every CQSO he representctl  as 
the union of  such rninr~llal  ('QSOs" 'lhr (non-t  rrv~al)  minimal ('QSOs art! easily 
c.harncterizrd.  I.'r,r  ;in!- :I  t  fH'(,Y)  dcfirle  an c~lvnicnt  +,I  of T'(:(-(,Y)  as follows 
For all (( ', I))  L(.Y) 
Notc that FX= 'il  0t)si:rvc  ilso that. for each  .A t  f"'(S). the relat~o~i  IS 
the I('-prr~f(~rcrlcc:  tit~rlvt~cl  fro111  thr following prt:fvrr.nce  ortionng P4 on A.  I'or 
dl s,  y €  S, 
.r  f '.,,  y  a  x  @  .4  and 1j  E :I Fact 3.2  The set P;.,.(,Y)  \  {0} conszsls rractly of those elements zn Pcc(X)  \ 
{0) that are rntnzrnnl ~11th  rfspccl to set zncluszon 
Theorern 3.1 The set P;.,-;(,Y)  1s  a  base  of Pcc(X)  zn  the  sense  that each 
elerrtent  of P(;c(X)  1.7  thc unzon ctf  elenlpnts of P;c(X).  Thut IS, for all + E 
'f'cn(X). 
> = U +,A  for some fnrndy A 2 P(X) 
AEA 
The proof of 'Theorem  3  1 usrs, for each glben CQSO >,  thr followmg particular 
farn~ly  A  C  P"(x)  Ixt + E Pc,:(X),  and defirlr  a rnapptng f  P'(x)  - 
P0(,Y)  by 
f(.1)=  U  (-  (3 2) 
r  ,it( ) 
tht. ordrring F  In  Theorcrri .1  1  art
3  11'-preferences.  'Ttit,reforr, one [nay restate 
'I'lirwrern  3.1 in the follo\v~r.~g  way  :I  rc~lat~on  + is  111  Pc.(.(,\i')  ~f and only  ~f 
I  hc~rc~  c:x~sts  a finitt, sr,t  {PI,  P,,] of  prc,ftvricr  order~ngs  on X  such that for 
all  (.A  I{) c L(,\-) 
.-I  .-  H e  for some  2.  .A  r,  H  (3.3) It can easily  be checked  that t tic  "state space" (i f:  the farriily A  in  'l'hr- 
orem 3 1, or equivalently, a  represt,nting  family  {PI..  ., P,,}) 1s  not uniquely 
determined by +  However, as already observcd  In  [5],  there are stat(, spaces 
which  deserve special interest.  Consider  the set  { f(A) :  A E P0(X))  whrrc 
f  :  t-"(X) + P"(x) is  defined  as in  (3.2) above.  A  subset C  of  this set, is 
a  chazn  if  and only if  C  is completely  ordered  by  set inclus~on.  A  chain C  is 
nla~zmal  if and only ~f  C  is  not it proper subset of any other chain  Denote by 
r,,,  the set of maximal C~~IIIS  in {f(A)  :  A E  PO(X)}.  Obviously, ~v~ry  /(A) 
is  contained in some rnaxirrlal, chain  Hence, the representation in Theorem 3  I 
may be written as, 
(3  4) 
('lrarly. as  ~ri  thr, proof of 'l'hcvrc~rl  1. In ordt~r  to vcrify 'I'ht~ore~rl 1' one may 
ust3  f br:  farn~ly  A = { f  (.,I)  :i  E t'"(,Y)}  By  'I'hc:orr~r~~s  3 1  anti 3  I',  11  IS just  a 
matter of convmicncc, whethc:r  orit:  rrprtx,rlts a (-:QSO ;ih t ht,  intcrscct~or~  of a 
sr,t  of wak Il'-pr~fer~~nct~h.  or I~S  str~ct  p;trt by the IIIIIO~I  (IS thc corrt~spondin~ 
strict  ortfcr~ngs.  In  particular, wcT \v~ll  idso rt,ff,r to ;I  silt  {I?,.  , 11'~~)  of w\~k 
orderings on  .Y  as  a  reprtwnt~rlg  Tiirr111\.-  for  E  R,.,.(,Y) wht~nt:vt~r  tht,  51.1 
{ PI.  .  .  I<,} of the correspond~ng  strict  orclt)r~ngs  1s a rtrprtwritlng I'iln~ily  far t hl, 
corresponding str~ct  ordcr~ng  Pi.,  (.Y  j  In  the)  wnw  tit~fintd  prc~viously 4  Rigid Preferences over Alternatives 
Lct 2 E  Rcc(X),  and let  R>  -  be the induced  partial order on  X  defined  by 
(2.1).  As  we  have  argued, RF  -  may be  interpreted  as describing  a  decision 
maker's context independent  preference  jugdements involved in  the ranking of 
opportunity sets. The following fact is easily verified. 
Fact 4.1  Let t  E  Rcc(X)  and  kt  {Rl,  ..., R,)  be  a  representzng famdy  of 
uccordrng to Theorem 3.1'.  Then, for all x,  y E  X, 
By Fact 4.1, a weak preference for x over y is context-~ndepenclent  ~f and only ~f 
it IS respected by all vlewpo~nts,  or In othcr words, ~f  and only  ~f  ~t 1s  rcsprctcd 
ln  every  poss~ble  "prcferente  world "  In  accordance  w~th  tcrr~~~nology  In  the- 
theory of poss~ble  worlds  one rn~ght  thus call ft+ dlso thr, drc15lon rn,~hrr  .;  rzqzd 
preferences dmong thc clrments of S 
Also, consider the casc wherc there is an independently g1vr.n  ~)iirt~iil  ordcr li 
or1 ,Y  representing  the decls~on  maker's (partial) preference ~udgorrtrnts  on th~ 
srt  A'.  Assume that the ordering >I of sets respects  R In  t.he srrlsc3 th~t  .cRy 3 
.rR?y  Then by  Fact 1.1,  f< is  respected  by all viewpoints,  I  t,  .rRy  sK,y  for 
a  i  E  { 1  .  11  Ol~viously,  analoguous statements are t rut  for  tho syrnrnetrir 
part  IF  - of R>  - 
A  natural  quest~on  to  i~~k  in  this context  is  therefore  wt~ctt~er  the same 
ii~)~)l~e-"Io  to the asylnnwtrlc part  P>  - uf  RF  - which is  drfincd t)y 
for all x,  y E X  Pcrhaps surpr~s~r~gly,  thr answer 1s  no  To  st^  tt~~s,  cons~dcr 
the follow~ng  exarnplt~ 
Exarriplc 4.1 Let  .Y = {z  I/  :}  nnd define an cltment  t  Z(.(.(X)  its follows 
['or ;ill  (A,  H)  E  S(.Y) 
.jt  r f3  e  [A = B  or (A # {y} and A  #  {z})] 
It can bc ver~fied  that, for  instance. {R1,  Itz)  w~th 
rIl  yPlz and XI~:I'~!J 
1s  a  representing fam~l  of  wrak  orders for  t Note  that  for  the order~ng 
defined  above one has zl'?y  However; the wcak  order  R1   doc^  not  respect 
this strict preference judgcment.  Indeed, in  this example there cannot exist  ii 
rcpreserlt~ng  family {R1,  . R,,} such that each R, respects the str~ct  preference 
for x over y In  t,hr srnse that for all i, xP,y.  '1'0  see  this, assume t,hat for each 
z. ~P,Y  F~rst,  observe  t.hat  slnce  {!j.z} + {:)  therr must  ~~x~st  J  E {I.  ,111 
such that yP,:  Hencc, by  transitivity one could conclude r[\:  and xI;!J  wh~ctl woi~ld  irnpl) {x,  y, ;  } + { y, z} Howevcr, this is  falsr hy assurrtption 
L3j  thls riarr~plc,,  the ~nduced  strlc~  preference  rclntion  I-'>  -  cannot  nlwajs hc 
interpreted  rts  rlgld  strict  preference  In  the follow~ng,  we  w~ll  c lic~ractrr~~c, 
thr clnss of  ordrr~ngs  In  72cc.i.Y)  for  whtch  an Interpretation of  I'>  ns the r~g~d 
strlct  preference  judgements IS poss~ble The character~zatlon  1s  hnsed on  thr 
followlng cosld~t~on  of  strict  monoton~clty Let  Q  br a blnary  relnt~on  on X 
Say that  1s  strzctly monotone w~th  respect  to Q ~f  and only  ~f  srttlsfies  thr, 
followlng condltlon 
SM(Q)  (Str~~t  hlonoton~city)  For all A  E PO(X),  and all x,  y t ,I' with xQy, 
A U {y}  > A +  A U  {y}  U  {T)  + '4 U  {y} 
Inti~itlvely,  th~s  conci~t~on  rnay  be  paraphrased as follows.  Suppose, that  r()!/. 
I  (,  s~rppose  that  1 is  “Q-preferred"  to  y.  C'ondition  SM((2) states  that, ~f 
;~dd~ng  y  IS of  value,  t.hcn  adding  x, which  is  Q-preferred  to  y, r1111st  1)r.  i~f' 
c7vc,n grc1ater vnluf,  'Thc followlrig thcorrrn shows that Shl(P>)  -  is  thc~  11rcess;Lrx 
ant1 sufliclcr~t  corltl~t~or~  for  P>. being  ~nterprctahlc  as thr dec~s~or~  rt~itkcr's  r~g~d 
strlct  preSrrt,ncc judgt~r~lerlts  In  the throrerrl. ~t  1s  corlvcrllt,rit LO  work  with  t11r 
;isymrnr~tr~c  part  t  of  all ordcring  E  Rc,-c(S) 
Tlitx~re~rl  4.1  I.rt r  t  'P(.(,(,\i). Thcrc c~zsts  a  reprcsentzny /arnzl~/  {i', .  .., P,,} 
.511ch  that 
J  -  for ill  i  {  1.  ,  rl},rPLy 
(:orlsltier  now  the cast:  wtrrrr  1r1 add~tior~  to the ranking  lrr  C(,Y) thcrc is  an 
lr~dependcntly  glvrll  partla1 ~~rcfcrence  relatior1  P on  S wtlirh  IS  asyrrisrit'trlc 
arid  trarls~tivc f,'~~rtllt-rr~lore.  suppost:  that  rr,spects  P  tri  thc scnsc that for 
iill J, E  .Y. 
x P!/ 3 .r P>  -  !/  ((1 1) 
5  Closedness under Compromise 
In  r~~y  {  ,  If,,)  of  ~,ref(,rf,ncc,  orclcri~lgs  or1  .Y can  ht.  rc,prcw:rltetl  It>- 
i  Sir111  14  =  {  ,  . u,,}  of  utlllt:;  f\inct~o~~s  on  X in t tic,  senst.  that  for zE (1,  ,n)  and allx !,EX 
Say that a farnlly {Rl  , R,}  1s  clored  under compromzse IS and on14  IS there 
~~1st~  a  fam~ly  U  of  representing  ut~l~ty  funct~ons  that IS  convex,  I  e  for  all 
X  E [O,l],  u,  v  E U ~mpl~es  Xu + (1 -  X)v  E U  A  property such as convex~ty 
seems to be su~table  to dlst~ngu~sh  the ~nterpretat~on  of  "possible" prefrrrnce as 
reasonable, or legit~nlate  preference  from the flexlbll~ty  lnterpretat~on  of  "pos- 
sible" preference as probable preference  Indeed, there seems to be good reason 
to assume that a convex combmatlon of  legltlrnate (or rrasonabir) preferences 
should Itself br.  leg~tlmate  (reasonable)  In contrast, thls does not seem to apply 
to the case of  prohdble future prefe-rnces  For ~nstancc  a tiec~s~orl  maker rnay 
be uncerta~n  about hcr/hls preferc,nces bct\\er~n  L and y  hlle know~ng  for iurc. 
that (s)he ulll rlevpr  br ~nd~ffrrent  On the, other hand  ~f  both st r~ct  pri~ferrnc  i'\ 
J  P74 and IJPZ  are Itqztzri~a/~  one ~o111d  ft~l  tt~~tt  xIy rnl~st  bt'  Irglt~rn~xte  too 
('onvex~ty  of scts of prcf(.rc nccs has bcc n ~ntroduced  111 \ehrlng  171 <~s  clowl 
rlrss under compromise  to clar~fj  \\hat it means to ratzonalzzr a cho~ce  funct~ori 
111 terms of  a wt of  prcfcrt~ncc~s  'rZ  hrlc  ~t  was shown thcrc that convt,xlt\  can 
be required  w~thout  loss of generality. 11  adds a surprising amount, of struct,urc 
In  t.hc prt:serlt  context  For Instance. ~t  w~ll  be shown In  the next section that ~t 
~rnplies  rlg~d~ty  of str~ct  prc~ft~rcrlcc~.  I  c  it ~rnplics  condition Shl(P>)  -  Morcovc,r. 
it  irnpl~es  the follow~ng  propi3rty 
IIE (lrrele\ance of  Ineswntl~il  I:lc~rncnts) For  all  .1 E  l'('(S)  anti all s  y  t '1 
such that not XI?  y 
[.4 u  {x}  u {y} -  :I  u  {s}  and :l  u  {x}  u  {7j} -  A u  {!/)I *  A u  {x  7/} - I 
'I'hc.  ~ntultion  twh~nd  IIE  1s  as  follows.  Suppose that  in  a  set  contairl~ng  s 
and y  the delct~on  of  t,~rhtxr s  and y  dam  not reduce the entailed  opportun~ty 
value.  Then  the loznt cielct~on  of' x and  !/  do~s  not  rcducrl  opportt~nlt?;  value, 
r~ther  In th~s  sense, ~riessentlal  eltl~nents  arr ~rrclevant  for the ordering >  This 
sccrrls to be plaus~ble  cnough t;xcl-.pt  In  t he ciise  whcrc x  and y  arc ~ndiffcrent 
frorn  every relevant  v~r~wpo~nt  Indeed, suppose  that  s and y  urf ~ndlffm~nt 
111 any possiblr  "prdcrt>nce  world.'  I  e  suppose that sl>y  -  Then the,  sct  :1  U 
{x}  U  {y}  1s  ~nd~ffercnt  to t~oth  .4 u {s}  and :I  U {TJ}  liowcvcr.  IS frorrl somi, 
v~cwpoint  all elements of .-I arr inkr~or  to s  and y.  onc would obt,a~n  Au{x, ly}  > 
.,I, in  contrad~ctlon  to the corlclu:j~on  of'  IIE  llcncc,,  thc clause excluding r~g~ci 
~nd~fference  between  x  and y In  111;  " Theorem 5.1  Let t  E  'Rcc(X).  Therc exzsls a represcnlzng famdy for  that 
1.s  closed  under coinpromzse  zf  and only  zf  ~atzsfi~s  IIh,'. 
As an illustration of Theorern 5.1,  consider the CQSO  defined in  Eu;~rr1ple,,1  ! 
Obviously,  does not satisfy IIE. Indeed, by definition one has {x,  y,  2} -  {s,  z} 
and {x,  y, z}  {y,  z),  but  (2,  y, z) >  {z)  although  x and  y  are not  rigidly 
indifferent. Accordingly, there cannot exist a representing family that is closed 
under compromise.  This can  be verified  as follows.  Let  { R1,  ...  , L}  be any 
representing family for k.  Since  {x,  y,  z} -  {x}  and {y,  z}  + {y),  there must 
exist  R, such that xRizPiy. Similarly, since {x,  y,  2) -  {x}  and {y,z}  > {z}. 
there  must also exist  R,  such  that xR,  yP,z.  Closedness  under  cornpromise 
would imply the existence of  Rc  such that tP,y and xfiz. However. this is  not, 
poss~ble  since by definition, {s,  y, ;:)  -  {y,  z}. 
6  On the Structure of IIE Orderings 
In  thc "possible preftxrc.rlct,  worlds," ex-post  indlffercncr~  is  ;~rguat)ly  poi~~tlf~ss. 
or irrelevant. at least  u~llrss  alterr~ntlves  are ex-anti.  (ie rigidly) ir~ciiffcrorlt  " 
('onsequently. it seems natural to requirc a represent.ir~g  family of  ;L (IQSO  to 
c~ffectlvr~ly  consist of 1zn~arordering:j.  Say that a represc:nting f:mily  {IfI.  .  , 
of a (CQSO  1s  effect~v~ly  lznrar ~f  and only if  for all s,  y  E  1%'. 
II(~rlct,  a representing fanrily is effectively linear if  arid only if  ;my indlff'er~ricc:  1s 
rigid. As it turns out,  the requirement that any ind~ffererlce  bc rigld is ~quivalcnt. 
to the requirement of  clost:dncss  under comprorrlisc, and hence to 111:;. 
Thrwrem 6.1  Let t  E  RC.(  (A')  7'hcre  exzrt5  a ieprc\rntzng famzly fo7 t  that 
I\  cflrectzzvrly  htrrur  zf  and only  zf  5  satzsfrrc IIE 
Sotr that ?'h~.orcrns  fi.1 and 4 1  entail t,hat for CQSOs. IIE in~plic:s  Shl(f'?)  I" 
'I'hc,  converse is. houww, not truc as t,he following example shows 
Example 6.1  Let  ,Y  = {x.  y,  2)  and definc a CQSO  E  'E(-c(,Y)  ;IS follows 
For all (A>  11) E E(.Y). is  a  represent~ng  family of  weak  orders for t Obviously, {R1,  R2,  R3) is  not 
(effectively) linear.  Indeed, there cannot exlst a representation with linear or- 
dering~  since in that case {x,  y,  z)  would have to be strictly preferred  to one of 
the sets {x,  y), {x,  z),  or {y,  2). However, by  the dcfinit.ion of  this is not the 
case. 
It is  not entirely clear  how strong an assumption IIE really is.  While the lin- 
earity characterization of Theorem 6.1  suggests the generic applicability of  IIE 
in some sense, the following two examples show that IIE may be rich  in impli- 
cations. 
Example 6.2 Denote by R the set of real numbers. Let  X = R2 and let 5 be 
an ordering in C(R2)  such that 5  satisfies  M and CC  Furthermore, suppose it 
IS known that for all a,  b, x E  R2, 
{a,  tl} -  {ash,  T}  tj  s t  (.(){a,  b}, 
In  order to wr~f  th~s  cla~rn,  suppose  that r E roA  'Ihere  arc,  two poss~l~lr, 
c ases 
C'LS~  I. 'I'hc'r('  ~'~1st  two pu111ts  01'  :I,  say u1  and  nz, such  that x  co{aI,  az). 
'l'hcw,  by  assumptlon {ul,  u?} - {al,  an, r),  hrrice  by  application of  CC, A - 
.-?  U {T}. 
O'ase 2.  'I'hrrr  (lo riot  es~st  two points as in  (he  I. It  IS easily  verified  that 
in  this casc  thrre  rr~ust  rsist  three points of  A,  say  a1.n~  and  as, such  that 
T  E  co{al,  a?.  (13)  ('on~lder  the st,raight line through  a, and x,  and denote hy 
y  the ~ntersect~on  of  t h~s  I~ne  with the line segrnrnt  as shown in Figure 1 
lnrcrl F'zyure  1  about  hcrc 
respectively  Yrorm  t h~s,  ono ohta~ns  by  IIE. {a,,  az, ng} - {ill a?,  a3,z.  y}. 
which finally ~rr~plles  :I  - .-I  u  {x} using  R1 and (:(:. 
Examplo 6.3 As in  the, prr,vlous  sample. let S = Rhnd  let t  he an order~ng 
in C(R.7 satisfy~ng  XI  and  ('(1  Suppose ~t  is known that for all A,  B E  P0(R2)  such that U !-  A and such that A has at most 4 elements 
Thcn, IIE implies that (6.1) holds for all finite sets .4, H E  P0(R2)  with B i  .-I 
In  order  to verify  this, let  15 C  A  Flrst. ~t  is shown  that A  2  COB  imphrs 
H -  .A.  Let  A = {xl,  ...,  x,,}  U H,  and consider for every  i E  {I,  ...,  TI} the sct 
BU  {x,}. By the argument given in the previous example,  onc has U - flu  {I,  } 
for every i E (1, ...,  n). Using M  and CC,  this implies by induction B -  A. 
Next, let x E A \ con. By t,he separating hyperplane theorem, there exists a 
straight line lI separating the point z and the set COB.  Now one can construct 
two further straight lines  l2 and 13  as shown in  Figure 2 such that the set coH 
is contained in  the triangle spanned by  the intersect,ion points tl,  t2 and t3 of 
these straight lines. 
7  Multiple Preferences and Choice Functions 
In th~s  section, 'Thcorrrr~  tj  1  is  appl~td  in order to uncover a structural Isomor- 
phlsm  between  the subrlnss of  CJSlOs  sat~sfy~ng  [IF, and choice  funct~ons.  .,Is 
1r1  Puppe [12], define for  each set  .A  E P"(,Y) 1t.s subset of  rssentzal  fleme71f.i 
E(.'1)  C :I  h!, 
f.,.(:I) .=  {.r  c :I  .,I > .  1 \, {.r } }  (7  1i 
For  tlot.at~onal  corlvt~rl1r~1lcr.  In  (7 1) wc,  ha~t,  wl.  .d  F  for  all  il  E P"(S'I 
flcncc. Irl our tc~rrn~nology.  r E  E(.-l)  ~i'  and only if  r 1s  essc,r~t~al  at il \ {z) 
Fact 7.1  Let  br  an or.dfr.znq zn  X(S)  .sutlcfyzrlg  condztzon.~  .\I  arid  Ilk.' s~itii 
that for all x,  y E  .\-,  r1r.y => r = !I. 'l'hcn. 
(z) fur  all (.A. U) \-(.YT.  .-I F  l?  t>  (..I  \ B)  1-1  [<(,,I) # a. 
[LZ)  fur  a// .-I  E l'"(,Y). Ej,l)  # a. SD((;)  (Strict (;-Dornlnance)  For all  (A,  I]) E C(X), 
Hence, by SD, the set A  is strlctly preferred  to B C  A  ~f  and only  ~f  1 conta~ns 
some potent~ally  valuable alternative that IS not available In  B  Condition SD 
may be vlewed ds  general~zing,  at ledst  prlrna fact?, the account of prrference for 
opportun~t~~s  offered  in  Seci~on  3  Let  {PI,  , P,}  be a set of  I~near  order~ngs 
and denote, for  each  A  E  PO(X),  by  rridxp, A  the (singleton-)set of  rnaxlmal 
elements In  A  wlth respcct  to P,  [f one defines for all A  E PU(X), 
condition  SD(G) colrlc~drs  w~th  (3L3)  Ottlcr  int,erpret,at,ic~~ls  of  (;  and SD((;) 
~rlclucie  the following  (;(..I)  rnay dt?scr~bc  a set of  accrptablr ;~lt.ern;ttlves  based 
By  Fact  7  2(1),  cui~tiit~o~i  SD  ~dentifir~s  the-  scts of  essential  elenit>nts  with  thr~ 
sets of  '.potent~ally  valnablc" elcnwnts. ('onvt:rsely, by  Fact  7.1 any orderirlg > 
satisfying conditions  \I  and IIE, s;ttisfies condit~on  SL)  w~th  respcct  to C;  =  I..' 
prov~detl  t,hat any  I>-irlcilffcrence  -  11s tr~vlal 
('ontiit~orl  SI) ~ncieed  establishrs a strr~ctural  isornorph~s~n  hvtwc,t,r~  the. sub 
class of  QSOs satlsfylng IIE and cholcrx frinctlons  Tht. following rc,sult  dcsc-rit)t:s 
some of  the connections  between  propertics of  the runklng > and well-known 
cons~stency  properties of  the "cholcc fur~ctlon"  (;  -  l'"(S) - l'"(.Y) (s~vt  e I$  Svr~ 
[10], Aizrrrnan and \lal~shcxvsk~  [I].  \foulln  [6]) fi~rthermort-,  zf  F zs  negatlvcly transztzve then (;  ratzsfies the follor~llng  so-called 
"Azterman" condztzon  For all1 A,  O'  E t"'(X) wzth B  A, 
(Aiz)  <;(A)  13  3 G(B)  c G(,4) 
Conversely, zf G satzsfies (a)  and (Azz) then > 2s  negatzuely transztzve 
Thus, the key  consistency  conditions defining a CQSO  correspond  to the ba- 
sic  rationality conditions on choice  functions, (a)  arid  (Aiz).  This ntcely  con- 
firms the claimed generality of  the CQSO approach (see the concluding section 
for  further  discussion)  Notably absent is  "expansion consistency"  (Sen's  ?), 
which  would translate into the follcwing condit~on  on CQSOs  If for  all r E  A. 
{y, r)  + {x})  thrn {y}  U .4 > ,-1  Ilowrver, the status of  1.11is  condition as n  ra- 
tmrrality rcvluirrrne~~t  is  less clear. Il~deed.  t,he itppeal of c>xpansion  cons~stt>ncy 
hiis  ;~lreatly  bwr~  questioned in  Aizc~rrnan  i~r~rl  h4alishevski  [l] and Nchrirlg  [7] 
('omh~r~irrg  Theorems 7.1 and 6.  I  or1r  obtains the following result  which has 
first  t)wn 1)rovid by  Aizerman and I\lalishevsk~  [I] (see itlso [fj]). 
Corollary 7.1 (Aizerman and Illalishctvski)  Let G  -  P0(X)  -  PU(X)  hr  u 
~~tnpp~ny  zczlh  (:(.A)  C  A  for all '4 t  ['"(X). 7'hrn G sallsfics  ((1) and (',,lzz) tf 
i~nd  only ~f  thrri'  e~2,ct.s  a crt {Pi.  .  , P,,} of  l~near  orderz11y.r on S  such that for 
ill1  .-I E  Pd(S  I. 
Yote that, conversely. (~;i)roll,sry  7.1 could he used to deduce Theorcm 6.1. In- 
iiced, suppost:  wit,hout loss of  gt.nera1it.y  that for  all x,  y  E  IY,  zl+  y e  x = y, 
imtl let F  'Pc(:(X)  satisfy IIE  By  Fact  7 1. > satisifes SD with respect to the 
correspondt~r~ci.  C;  = E  wher,~  i?  :  jJ"(S') -  PO(X)  is  clefirlcd  as in  (7.1). Ry 
'I'hcorerr~  7.1, i:'  sat,rsfic:s (rt)  and (Air),  hence t)y Corollary 7.1. I,'  can hc ..ra- 
t.ii>nrtl~zc;d"  by a set  of 1111ear  lorderings  {PI,  .., P,,}.  It is then casily shown that 
this sc,t  {l',  . ..., t',,)  mr~stitutes  a rc,prrsent.ing fanlily for the orderir~g  t.  Not.6.. 
howevc>r,  that ollr proof in the appe~~tiix  rnt,a~ls  a sorrlewhat stronger result than 
.l'hc-orcrn 6.1. 111  t hiit  it shows that given  IIE the maxirrial chain represrntiition 
of  ;i ('QSO  15 c,ffectlvely  lint!ar;  this wo111d also seen1  to lerld  support  to the 
gc,r~c~r~r~t.y  ~r~Wrprr~tat,iorl  of  the result. 
8  Conclusion: On the Generality of  CQSOs 
I~ascd  on t.wo simple ;isloiris  C:onditiorl  Xl swms to hr uncor~trovrrsial,  hcncr, 
r  11e cr~~ci;il  corrd~t.ion  is ('C  (';in (:(,'  asplrcx to thc status of a  gcncr.c~l  axiorrl of 
.'corls~sto~lt,"  ~)rc~ferr~nct~  for  opportr~nit~t~s'?  Quit? poss~hly.  as we shitll argue in concluding this paper based  on the discussion of an apparent counterexample, 
provided that the "alternatives" are appropr~ately  specified  as the carriers of all 
value. Consider an agent whose choices between behaving "cornrrlonly selfishly" 
(x), "cheaply"  (y)  and "rrlagnanirnously"  (z)  are described  as follows 
The underlying story  might be  that while  the agent 1s  naturally  lnclirled  to 
behave commonly selfishly, slhe  is roused  to magnanimity in the presence of an 
opportun~ty  for cheap behaviour.  If one distinguishes magnanimity when cheap- 
ness is feasible  (z~~)  from mlagnan~mity  when cheapness is not feasible (zay), 
these choices can be rationalized  by  the preference  ordering z3,  PxPzjy  Py on 
thr set  .Y  = {x,  y,  23y,  ~3~)  Rank~ng  wt~  by  thelr chosen  elemrnt y~rlds  the 
follow~tig  ortier~ng  on  Po(:\')  with  X = {s,  y,  z} 
l,~t  k, denote  the.  restr~ctlon  of  y:  to Y(.Y)  Obv~ously,  to  1s  t,ransitive  In 
Y(X) and satlsfirs  11  ('II~II-e  is  valued  here  spec~fically  the possibility of 
being rnagnanlmous 111  the face of the opportun~ty  of being cheap  In  the sensc 
that  {!y,  z}  >-,  {y}  as wll  ;.rs  {y,  z}  t,  {z},  arid {x.  y,  z} >,  {s,  y}  as  ~~11 
as {r,  y. z} F,  {x,  :}  011  thc other hand. ('(:  IS v~olated,  since {x} -,  {x,  z} 
wh~lc  {x.  y. z} +,  {x.  y}  ('lrarly, if onc redescr~hes  sets as subsets of the refined 
unlvrrse X.  C('  (appropriatciy applicd) 1s  sat lsfied agaln. 
'I'lie  above example  shows how part~culnr  lnstances of a context-dependence 
of the value of elements can bc accornmotiatrd t)y ~ncluding  the relevant features 
of thc "rontcxt" in  the spec~fication  of an clement. Sometimes it is asserted that 
the pr0ccs.s of  chow  has ~ntrlns~c  value ~tsrlf Jones arid  Sugden, for  ~nstancc. 
suhstant~ate  that ~nt,uit~ori  by  dwelop~rlg  an ~nttxsting  argument for  the value 
of  "szgnzficanf choice,“  whlch occurs when  a person  "while choos~ng  r~asonably, 
acts contrary  to a  prt~ft~rt~r~c:c~  that  he  rn~ght  reasonably  have had" (14,  p.601). 
Not~ons  of  the ~ntr~nsic  valuts of  s~gnificant  cholct and the "procrss of  choice" 
more gr:r~crally may"  thus kad to pcrva.srue  context-dependence.  While this 
would not ~nvalitiate  \I  and 1::C.  it would  rob thrsc conditions of  their bite, at 
Ivast  w~thout  add~t~onal  structure on  t hrl  naturv of  the context-dependence. 
Appendix: Proofs 
Proof of  Fact 2.1 Suppose that xR+~j  I  e  {L } -  {x,  y}  By ('('  t h~s  ~rnpl~es 
flu  {x} -  11  u  {s y}  I'urthcrmort, Mlrnp~lc>\  MU  {r,  y} k  BU  {y}  Thereforr 
I1 U {y} t  ('  ~lnpl~es  H  U {r  y}  (' ud  hcncc  B  U {r)  (' ('onvcrsely, (2  2) 
~rnplles  xR>  - y  hy Ictting 13  =  {x}  ,md (' = {L  11) Proof of Theorern 2.1 Clearly, rf  is  an IU-preference  the rnduceti  partla1 
order R> is complete. Conversely, let  IZ>  be complete on X.  In order to show 
k  = IU(R+)  -  we  have to verify  that for 21  (A,  B) E C(X), 
.4  k  B a for all b t B  there exists a E A  such that aR*O.  -  (J\  1) 
[f B  A,  (A.1)  is trivially satisfied. Hence, let A C: R,  and let a* he a rnaxlrnal 
element in  A  = {xl,  ...,  x,,,}  with  respect  to Rh, i.e. {a*} -  {a*,  r,)  for  all 
i = 1,  ...,  rrr.  First, suppose that A  B.  By  CC, {a*,xi)  -  {a*,  x,,  z,}  for 
all i,  j, hence by transitivity {a*) ,-  {a*,  xi,  x,) for all i,j.  Thus, by  induction 
one obtains {a')  -  A, and hence  by  transitivity, {a'}  B.  This implies. hy 
condition M and transitivity, a* R+y  for all y E  R. Next, suppose that the right- 
hand side of (A.l)  is satisfied. 'rim,  a*K+  y  for all y  E  B,  hence  by  indu(.t~on 
itnd CC,  {a*}  F!  This implies A 5  13  tv M and transitivity. 
Proof of' Fact  3.2 First  tw show that for any t  E  'P(:c,(X)  \ {a)  t,hc.rc, ~~si~t.; 
.  fO).  .-I  # ,Y,  s11ch that  +.  This can  he  verified  as follows  (;IVPII 
+ E Prc~.(.Y),  1r.t / : I'"(S) --  P
O(.,Y)  be the inapping defined  in (X2). Oixrr\i~ 
that by  \I  and CC, tl C  '4  inlplies f(l3)  j(A)  (cf. [5, Lemma ~(II)]).  Also. 
one easily shows that for all  rl E P
O(X),  j(f(.4))  = f(A)  (cf. [5,  Lerrlrna 2(a)j) 
In  part~cular,  the sets of  thc forrn  f(A). A  E  P
O(X),  are  precist:ly  the firfii 
politls of  the mapprng /.  Lct  U C  (I,' bc such  that C  +,(A)  D,  i.e. [' g f!:l) 
and  D  /(A). In  particular, f(l1) C  j(A). \.Ye  will  show  that  C  >  f) 
:Iss~urnc~  to the contrary that D -  C.  'I'heri,  by  the definition of  f.  ('  /(I)). 
hence (;  C  f(A)  liowever, this is  false  11y ass~imption  anti therefore  C,'  I) 
This shows that for each  A  cf  Po(,\:), >f(,4)c  >. Finally, suppose that + #  O. 
hence for  some (C.  I))  E  X(.Y),  C > I).  Then, C,'  f(D),  hence  /(I)) f  .Y 
'l'his  proves  that if  an rlerncnt of  :Pcc(,Y) \ {0}  is  minimal it is  cont.ained  111 
'P;,(.(/Y)  \ {a}. 
It  remains to br shown tllat. irltleed  every clernent of P:,(X)  \ {lil}  is  lrlirl- 
irnal.  Ilence.  let  .-1.B E  P7(X)  such  that .4  #  X  and t,lC  >,I. Ry  tii,fi- 
nition of  >-.,,  one has for  all  .r  $!  :I,  :I U {s)  +,I  '4. llcnce, by  ass~lrnptloli 
:I  u {z} FR <.I. wtlictl  by definition of  >~o  is only possrble when .-I = 13. (.'owe- 
qucntly.  +o irriplies A :=  H  w'tlich imrnrdiately implies rnininlality of  c,ach 
clerrlent in  P;-,.(S) \ 10) 
Proof of  Theorem 3.1 (lonsidcr  the farnil A - { f(il) :  .4  E  P0(.Y)} 13~ 
the proof of  Fact :L2, +J(A)iL > for  a11  A t Pn(X).  Hence, lt suflices to show 
t,hat for  all  (C.  I)) E  S(X).  C'  + I) implies C:  +J(,.,,  D for so~rl"~'  A E  I'll(,Y  j. 
Howevrr, by  the dt.finrtior~  of  f  :  P0(X) -  lJ"X)).  C + 13  implirs C'  g  /(I)) 
Also, one has 11  f(D).  IIeticc, by definition of  >j(n),  0'  >j,~i  I) 
Proof of Theorern 4.1 Necessity of  Shf(ll+) can easily be chrcked  along thi, 
1inc.s of  Example 4.1  Sr~fficicncy  of  SM(P>)  -  Ts  verified  by conslcicrirlg  the rrlas- 
irr~al  clla~n  rcprescntation  (;l.4).  It  IS shown that  for each maximal cha~n  C  till. corresponding  preference  ordering  PC satisfies xP+y  -  3  s  Pcy, provided  that > 
satisfies condition SM(P+) Thus, let  C = {HI,  ..., H,}  be  ii r~raximal  chain of 
fixed  points of  the rnapplng f  defined in (3.2) such  that 
Let  PC denote  the  preference  ordering  on  X  corresponding  to that maximal 
chain. Obviously, for all z,  ub  E X, 
zPcw  for some j  E  {I,  ..., m),  z $ H,  and  ILJ  E  Hj  .  (A.2) 
Now  let  x,  y  E X  be given such  that xP+y,  -  and let jo he the  minimal rndrs 
such that x E H,,.  First, we  show  that jo > 1. Indeed, assume to the contrary 
that x E  HI. In this case,  HI  {x} ant1  {x} -  {s,  y}  hcncc  rrsirig  the fact 
that f(Hj)  = fi, one would ot)tarn y E  Ill.  'Ihis in  turn rrnplros f({!l})  C  HI 
Howver. x $!  f (:{y}).  hence  /({!/})  is a  proper subsr>t.  of  tiI ~,hrch  coritradrcts 
rr~axlmality  of  the: chain C.  This proves j(, > 1 
Xext, we  show  that  y  E H,,-1.  Again, assume to the,  contrary  that  y $! 
r  >  Ill.  I hen, 11,,-  1 u  {y} >-  Let  H'  := f(H,,- u {!I}).  Clearly, 11' 
is  a proper  superset of  Also observr  that  HI,,  {s} - {x,  y) implies 
!J  E HI,, and  therefore,  H' C  HI,.  \t'e  now  show  that s  @  11'.  Irrtlred.  by 
condition ShI(P:,),  H,,-~u{!~}  + ilj,-1  ~rnplies  Hj,- Iu{~}u{x}  + Ill,-1  u{?/}. 
hence  x $ H'.  6ut this rrr~pl~es  that 11'  is  a proper sul)sc%t  of  HI,  which  again 
contradicts  maxirnality of  the chain  C.  'I'h~refore,  onc  rnust  have  :y  E  HJu-  1 
From this one finally obtains xPcy using  (A.2). 
Hence, xP>x  -  +  xP,y for  all  i  if  {PI,  ....  P,,}  is  the representing  farruly cor- 
responding to thc maximal chain  representation of  >.  Conversely, ~t  is obvious 
that [xP,y for all  i E {l,..  .n}]  3  sP?y. 
Proof of  Theorem 5.1 (Necessity of  IIE) In ordcr  lo  verify  nccr:ssit,y  of 
IIE, suppose that .4  u {s,  y} -  '4 iJ {r).  ;I  u {z,  y} -  :I  U {y) and riot  rl>!j.  - 
Let R  =  .. N,,}  t)t. a  representing farriily for  k  that 1s  closd undcr corrr- 
promise  Assurnc. contrary  to what  LIE  cla~ms,  that .4 IJ  {s.  !I} t A.  'This 
irr~plies  that for sornc j. .I u {r,  y} >,  A  where kl= II.'(RI)  Without loss of 
gcnerality, suppose  that xl?,!~. Given this, one can concludc  that xP,a  for  all 
(1  E '-4. Since  hy assurnptior:~.  .-I U {x,  y} -  .4  U {y}  onc rnust  have  zRlx for 
some z  E  A U ry}, hcncc  yRlx and  thercfore xlly. Since  r~ot.  XI>  y thrrr rnust 
exist  k  # j such  that yt+x. or  there tsists I  #  j such  that  ZP,;  In the first 
case, cons~der  the convex-combinat ion  Xuk + (1 -  X)uI ,  whcrc  uk,  uI  represent 
Rk,  Itl, respectivley, and let  IZx  denote  the corresponding  prefe~rt:ricr~  ordering 
in  '.  For sufficiently  small (but posit~ve)  X  one obtains !/l'~s and  yPxn for  all 
(L E  A.  IIowever, thrs cont.r.dicts the assumption that  :I  IJ {x.  !J) -  A U {z} 
In  the second  case, a syu~rrletric  argurnerit can  be applicd  111  ordcr to deriv(~  il 
contradiction  to the assumption  that  A  U {x,  y} - il U {y}. flcwct:,  in  t)ot,l~ 
cases one can conclude  :\  U (s,  y} .-  ./I  as requ~rcd  by  Ilk:  'l'hc.  sufficiency  part, of Theorern 5 1  IS conveniently  bdwd  upon Theorem 6 1  Hence, we prove that 
result first 
Proof of Theorem 6.1 Necessit,~  of  1lE is easily  ver~fied.  Thc proof of  the 
sufficiency  part consists in  s,howing that, given condition  IIE;,  the representing 
fanlily corresponding  to t2hc rnnxirnal chain  representation  of  IS effectively 
linear.  Let  C =  {HI,  ...,  H,,) he a  mammal chain  of  pairwise  different  fixed 
points of the mapping f defined in (3.2)  such that H,  = X and Ii, c  for 
j  E  (1, ...,  m-1). From (A.2) it IS clear that the representing family correspond- 
ing to the maximal chain  rt:presentation  is effectively  linear  provided that (i) 
{v, w) C  Ifi implies vI+w,  -  a.nd (ii) for all j E  (1, ..., m-  I}, {I),  w) C  HJ+1 \ HJ 
implies vI+w.  -  In order to verify  (I),  suppose that {v,  w} C  HI  for v #  UL  By 
CC,  f({v, 10))  C:  HI.  Assume that not  111>u).  -  I  e.  {I,, 11,)  + (11)  or {v,  u,} + {w). 
LYithout  loss  of  generality. 'we  ma,, assullle that  {I?. w}  {c}.  tlowcver, this 
would imply that f({v})  is a. proprr srlt-rsct of ill wh~ch  cont,rxdlcts rnaxinlal~ty 
of  the chaln.  Hence, onr rnr~st  11;ivt'  It8. 
- 
Nt,xt. ~wshow  (ii). Supposr thttt  {c. ~,}  C  11,+,'~,/1,  for  1:  #  11,  111 ptirtic~~lar, 
[IJ U {I }  L Ill  ~ncl  Ill  U {u  }  > Ill  (kns~dcr  /It  = J(llJ  L,  {L}) and 11''  = 
J(lll U { (I,}) f3j  condit~on  ('(:.  El
1. Ill'  C  IIJtl,  ~CIIC~,  t)y ~naxirrl;~lity  of the 
ct1a111  C. /I1  = Htl = IfJ+~  'I'his ~n~plics  lIJu{v!  w}  -  lIl~{r~}  iind ll1u{~~,  IL~} - 
I{,  CJ { w} Now iissurnr that ]not 111~  u,  Then. IIE would 11np1y  /IJ  Li  (1,. 11:) -  HI 
wl~lch  cor~tractlcts  t.hc fact that H,  1s  a.  fixcd  po~nt  off  HI,IIW, [,I>  -  11, 
Proof of Tllcwrcnl  5.1 (Sufficic?rlcy  of IIE) Let  E 'R,.c.(,f')  satisfy  111~;. 
I  It  {I  ,  ll,,}  tw  ;i  rl-presrntlng  farndy for  t  that  IS  efl'rct~vcly  linear 
xcordi[~g  to 'l'heorern  6  1. 'I'hc  followirlg proof is based upor) the construction in 
[7,  Th 61  I:lx  r  s~~ch  that 0 .:  r  <  1/71,  and define for each  1  = 1.  , ri imd all r E 
,Y,  ~L,(T)  .=  C#{:EX  'f',r)  OI)~IOUSI~,  for all z  = 1,.  . n,  11,  reprcsc~nts  R,. ~t  ~III 
ht, shown that the convex hull U  of  {ul.  . u,,} const~tutc~s  ;I rtXprt3sent~ng  family 
for  as well  1,i.t  (:I.  H)  t  \'(.\')  Ohvlously, rnax,~.~  ~(s)  > 1llax,.~n  u(r)  for 
all  IL  t  I4  ~rnpl~t=s  :I  n  Tl~t,  con\r:rse  implication is shown hy  ;I  contradict~on 
;trgun~c,nt fIt,rrcc, sr~l)l)osc>  t I131  :I  >  Ij. I  P  for all  i = 1. .  .  11. 
For id1  I. 1c,t I,*  E  iirgrnax,~  rl,(s) l\'c now show that. for xll  1,  .r:I:b  Intlccd. 
1))  01  3) orirJ has zL.;K,b  011  tht, otl~c,r  tiarld. .r;Ikb for solllt3 k  1vo111d  Imply t)y effective  linearity! xl*lib for all i, which  is  not possiblc by  (11.4).  C~onsequently, 
for all  i, 
Since, u,(z) is  non-negative for all i  and all z E X,  (A.5) and (A.6) together 
imply that for all i, A;  < Iln. Howevrr, this contradicts the fact t,hat the Xf 
add up to 1. 
Proof of  Fact  7.1 Given (A,  B)  E  C(X),  it is clear that (A  \ R)  n E(A)  # 0 
implies A  > B.  Conversely,  let  B 5  A  and suppose  that for  all  x  E A \ R, 
A -  A \ {x). Then, by  succe,sive application of  IIE, A -  B.  This proves (i). 
In order  to verify  (ii), assume that for  some A  E Pu(X)  with  #A  >  2, 
1:'(:1)  = 0.  Hence, for some L, #  UI,  {v,  w}  A and '4 -  '-1 \  {x}  for every x t  A 
Succes~vc  application of IIE implies A -  {I,) and '4 -  {w}. IIencc by  condition 
M,  {I),  ZU} -  {v) and {v,  w}  - {ub} which  contradicts t.hr assl~nlpt~ons.  Thus. 
k'(il) # 0  for all A  t  P0(X) 
Proof of  Fact  7.2  I'arts  (i)  (iv) are easily  verified.  Htwce,  it, suffices  to 
show  that  sat~sfies  condit~on  LIE.  Clcarly. .4  U {r)  U {y} - A  U {r} and 
.A U {x}  U  {y} -  .1  U {y}  imply y  $?  (,'(/I  u  {r}  U {y}) and s  @  u {x) U {!I)). 
respectively.  lIowwcr, this inlplies hy  SD(C:).  .4 U  {x,  y} -  .4 
Proof of  Theorem  7.1 Gl.i.en SIl(G).  the rquivalencr  between  C'C:  and (0) 
1s  easily  verified.  In  order  to deduce  (Aiz) from negative  transitivity, obst!rvc' 
that for  B  C  A, (;(A)  c  H  i~npl~es  .4 - R.  Sow srlpposc  that x  E  G(1J). 
ie.  B  + B \ {.c}. By  negative transitivity, it > B \  {x},  hence by SD! 
Proof of  Corollary 7.1 S\'cxessity of  ((k)  and  (Alz) is  obvious  Iri order  to 
show their sufficiency, define a binary relat~ori  In  C(X)  by  conditions M  and 
SD(G'). Uy Theorein 7.1,  is an clement of'Rcc.(S). Hy  Fact 7 'L(v),  satisfies 
IIE. Furthermore, hy  Fact  7  'L(iiij, any rigid  iridiffcrence  1s  trtvia.  Hence, by 
Theorem 6.1  t.hcrrt ex~sts  a representing fatriily {PI.  ..,  P,,} for  that conskts of 
Itnear orderings.  It can tw  vcrified  that {PI. . P,)  ratio~~alizes  C;  in  t.he sense 
of Corollary 7.1 Best  Varlants Cholce  Some Aspects," IEEE Trans.  Automat  Control 26 
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